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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY
UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR HEARSAY
ADMITTED UNDER A NON-"FIRMLY ROOTED"
EXCEPTION - Idaho v. Wright1
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1845, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant
does not necessarily violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.' However, to be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay must meet two
requirements: 3 (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify, and (2)
the declarant's statement "[bears] adequate indicia of reliability." 4
The reliability prong of the test is satisfied when out-of-court
statements fit within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.' Other-
wise, the statements not fitting within a firmly rooted exception
are inadmissible absent a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 6
What evidence constitutes particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness for hearsay not within a firmly rooted exception re-
mained unclear until the recent United States Supreme Court de-
1. 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990).
2. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)(applies to the Sixth Amend-
ment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporates the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. These two requirements are only applicable after the hearsay is deter-
mined to be admissible under an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay.
Ohio v: Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
4. Id. at 65.
5. Id. at 66.
6. Id.
1
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cision of Idaho v Wright.7  The Wright court held that
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness can only be supported
by evidence of the circumstances surrounding the declarant's mak-
ing of the hearsay statement.8 In so holding, the court determined
that corroborative evidence cannot be used to contribute to the
trustworthiness of out-of-court statements fitting within such ex-
ceptions as the residual hearsay exception.9 Though the Court's
decision clarifies the standard of reliability required for "non-
firmly rooted" hearsay to be admissible, it establishes a double
standard of reliability.
This note discusses the facts of Idaho v. Wright, examines the
history of the admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause, and analyzes the Wright decision. This note concludes that
by excluding the use of corroborative evidence in determining the
trustworthiness of non-firmly rooted hearsay, the Court enhances
Confrontation Clause protection for criminal defendants, but per-
haps at the expense of some crime victims, such as sexually abused
children.
II. THE CASE
In 1986, the State of Idaho jointly charged Laura Lee Wright
(Wright), respondent in this case, and Robert L. Giles, a male com-
panion of Wright's, with two counts of lewd conduct with a mi-
nor. 0 The minors allegedly involved were Wright's two daughters,
ages 51/2 and 21/2 at the time.1 The 5 1/2 year old was the daughter
of Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright (Louis), while the 2 1/2
year old was the daughter of Wright and Giles."
The allegations of sexual abuse surfaced when the 5 1/2 year
old told Louis' female companion (Goodman) that Giles had sexual
intercourse with her while her mother held her down and covered
her mouth.13 She also said that she watched them do the same
thing to Kathy, the 21/2 year old. 4 Goodman notified the police
7. 110 S. Ct. 3139.
8. 110 S.Ct. at 3150.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 3143. The governing statute was IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 (1987).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S, Ct. 3139 (1990). Louis and Wright had and infor-
mal agreement that each would have custody of the 51/2 year old six months out
of the year. Id. The allegations arose during Louis' custody. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 14:347
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who subsequently took the younger daughter from her parents and
placed her in custody for protection and examination.' 5
Medical examinations of* the two young girls by Dr. John
Jambura, "a pediatrician with extensive experience in child abuse
cases," revealed evidence of sexual abuse.'6 The physical condition
of the 2'/2 year old was strongly indicative of "'sexual abuse with
vaginal contact', occurring approximately two to three days before
the examination.'
7
Dr. Jambura also conducted a counseling interview with
Kathy to determine the cause of the alleged sexual abuse.' 8 After
initial questioning designed to relax Kathy and make her comfort-
able, Dr. Jambura delved into the subject of abuse by asking four
questions: (1) "'Do you play with Daddy?' "; (2) "'Does Daddy
play with you?' "; (3) "'Does Daddy touch you with his pee-
pee?'"; (4) "'Do you touch his pee-pee?'"' According to
Jambura, Kathy responded in the affirmative to the first three
questions but did not wish to answer the fourth."0
Through the testimony of Dr. Jambura at a joint trial of
Wright and Giles, the above questions and Kathy's responses were
admitted into evidence under one of Idaho's residual hearsay ex-
ceptions, rule 803(24)." Both Wright and Giles were each con-
victed on two counts of lewd conduct with a minor.2
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3144 (1990).
19. Id.
20. Id. In declining to elucidate on the fourth question, Kathy spontaneously
stated - in the words of Jambura- "[D]addy does this with me, but he does it a lot
more with my sister than with me." Id.
21. Id. Though IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24) makes availability of declarant imma-
terial, the parties agreed that Kathy was not capable of communicating to the
court. Id. IDAHO R. EvID. 803 states in relevant part:
"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness....
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically. covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence."
22. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3145 (1990).
.1992] 349
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Both Wright and Giles appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed Giles' conviction,2" but reversed Wright's conviction as to
Kathy.24 As to Wright, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that even
though Dr. Jambura's testimony was admissible under the residual
hearsay exception, it was inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
26
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
to the State of Idaho,26 and subsequently affirmed the Idaho Su-
preme Court's reversal of Wright's conviction.2 7
III. BACKGROUND
The admissibility of incriminating out-of-court statements
against a-criminal defendant has been the subject of evidentiary
and constitutional debate in the United States Supreme Court
since 1895.28 This is exemplified both by the historical develop-
ment of the admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause and by the use of corroborative evidence in evaluating the
reliability of hearsay.
A. The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against [him]." 2 9 Inter-
preted literally, the plain meaning of the Confrontation Clause
bars all hearsay statements.3 " However, this interpretation was re-
jected in Mattox v. United States under the rationale that excep-
tions to the "technical letter" of constitutional provisions is war-
ranted by the necessity to protect the public and to prevent "a
manifest failure of justice. '31
The incorporation of the Confrontation Clause into the Four-
23. State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1989). Unlike Wright, Giles had not
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court based on his right to confrontation. Id.
24. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224 (Idaho 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court's
rationale for reversing the decision was that Kathy's out of court statement fell
under a nontraditional hearsay exception and that the interview of Kathy lacked
procedural safeguards such as videotaping. Id. at 1226.
25. Id.
26. Idaho v. Wright, 493 U.S. 1041, 110 S.Ct. 833 (1990).
27. Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3153.
28. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1985).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. Wright, 110 S.Ct. at 3145; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 340.
31. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 340.
[Vol. 14:347
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teenth amendment in 1965 and the enactment of exceptions to the
hearsay rule seemingly induced the United States Supreme Court
to distinguish between admissibility of hearsay under an exception
to the hearsay rule and admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause.32 The Court established that even though the hearsay rules
and Confrontation Clause protect similar values, the two are not
mirror images of one another.33 Evidence admissible under an ex-
ception to -the hearsay rule nonetheless may be prohibited by the
Confrontation Clause.3 Generally, the Court required that hearsay
possess significant indicia of reliability in order to comport with
the Confrontation Clause.35
In 1980, the evolution of admissibility standards for hearsay
continued. That year the Court enunciated a "two-prong" test for
determining when hearsay statements incriminating to a criminal
defendant are admissible under the Confrontation Clause.36 The
first prong requires that "the prosecution either produce or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against defendant. '37 The second prong requires that
the statement also bear "adequate 'indicia of reliability'."38 This
second prong, which will be referred to as the reliability require-
ment, also has two components. First, when the hearsay falls
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception the'reliability of the
statement is inferred or presumed without any proof 39 Second,
when the hearsay fits within a non-"firmly rooted" hearsay excep-
tion, e.g., residual exception, it is inadmissible absent proof of reli-
ability.'0 The proof required is known as a "showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' ' 1
Wright does not discuss the unavailability prong.' 2 Rather, the
32. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 449 (1970); Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968).
33. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-156.
34. Id.
35. E.g. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1986).
36. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
37. Id. However, this unavailability requirement is not applicable to hearsay
statements of nontestifying coconspirators. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986).
38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990). (assumes that the 2 1/2 year
old declarant was unavailable within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause
1992]
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Wright Court focused on the reliability prong, particularly on the
issue of what constitutes "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" for out-of-court statements not fitting within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception 4 3
B. Hearsay Exceptions
For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, hearsay exceptions
are categorized into two groups: "firmly rooted" and - for lack of a
better description - "non-firmly rooted." The phrase "firmly-
rooted" was coined in Ohio v. Roberts and vaguely defined as
"those hearsay exceptions [which] rest upon such solid foundations
that virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'sub-
stance of the constitutional protection'" provided by the Confron-
tation Clause."" Hearsay exceptions within this category include
statements by a co-conspirator, 6 dying declarations,' former testi-
mony (previously cross-examined), 7 properly administered busi-
ness and public records,' 8 excited utterances, 49 and statements for
purposes of medical treatment." The Wright court stated further
that firmly rooted exceptions are those that share a tradition of
reliability based on "longstanding judicial and legislative experi-
ence in assessing the trustworthiness" of hearsay. 1
By contrast, non-firmly rooted exceptions may be defined as
those hearsay exceptions that do not share the same tradition of
reliability.2 The most common examples of such exceptions are
the residual or "catchall" exceptions.5 3 Whether the exception re-
quires that the declarant be unavailable or not is irrelevant, since
what are commonly referred to as rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are
essentially identical.5 4 Most states have residual exceptions similar
since the parties in effect agreed that she was incompetent to testify).
43. Id.
44. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
45. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
46. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3147. Because of the phrase "tradition of reliability," "traditional"
will be used interchangeably with "firmly rooted," and "nontraditional will be
used interchangeably with "non-firmly rooted."
52. Id.
53. E.g. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
54. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979); 4 D.
[Vol. 14:347
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to those found in the Federal Rules of Evidence."
Another hearsay exception that is not found in the Federal
rules, but that is becoming more common in state evidentiary
rules, is the child sexual abuse hearsay exception." As of 1987,
twenty-seven states had enacted a child hearsay exception.17 Gen-
erally, these exceptions allow state courts to admit into evidence
the hearsay statements of children who are unavailable to testify -
because of their young age, for example - when the statements ex-
hibit trustworthiness based on corroborating and other types of ev-
idence.5 8 The relative novelty of this exception indicates that it too
is not firmly-rooted.5 9
C. Reliability of Hearsay: Corroborative Evidence6" as an
Indicator
Prior to Wright, the United States Supreme Court, federal
courts, and state courts used corroborating evidence as an indicium
for determining the reliability of hearsay in criminal cases.
1. United States Supreme Court Usage
In Dutton v Evans,6 the Court examined and approved the
reliability of a hearsay statement (made by one of defendant's ac-
complices) that implicated defendant as being responsible for sev-
eral murders. For Confrontation Clause purposes, one of the four
factors the Court used as indicia of reliability of the statement was
corroborative in nature: that the declarant had "personal knowl-
edge of the identity and role of other participants" in the
murders. 2
In Lee v. Illinois,6" the Court reversed the conviction of a de-
LOUISELL AND C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 922 (1980) [hereinafter LOUISELL
AND MUELLER].
55. See LoUISELL AND MUELLER, supra note 53.
56. See J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.38 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter MYERS].
57. MYERS, supra, § 5.38, at 216 (supp. 1991).
58. See Id.
59. Id. § 5.38.
60. Corroborating evidence is "[e]vidence supplementary to that already
given and tending to strengthen or confirm it;[ aidditional evidence of a different
character to the same point." Black's Law Dictionary 311 (5th ed. 1979).
61. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77 (1986).
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. 476 U.S. 528 (1986).
1992] 353
7
Wadsworth: Constitutional Admissibility of Hearsay under the Confrontation C
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
fendant. The Court determined that a co-defendant's out-of-court
confession was not shown to be sufficiently reliable either from cir-
cumstances surrounding the statement or from the interlocking na-
ture of the defendant's confessions.6 The court concluded that
though some of the facts in the co-defendant's confession inter-
locked with facts in defendant's statement, there were enough dis-
crepancies to question the trustworthiness, motive and accuracy of
the co-defendant.6 5 However, the court did not rule out the use of
other types of corroborative evidence. It merely dealt with the use
of interlocking confessions as evidence of the reliability of hear-
say.6 The court even indicated that interlocking confessions would
be proper indicia of reliability if discrepancies were not
significant.6
7
Finally, Cruz v. New York 8 recognized the legitimate role cor-
roborative evidence can play in bolstering the reliability of hearsay
statements. In reference to the interlocking nature of confessions,
the Court concluded that when the co-defendant's confession "con-
firms essentially the same facts as the defendant's own confession
it is more likely to be true." 9 Thus, the Court affirmed the utility
of corroborating evidence in evaluating the reliability of hearsay
required by the Confrontation Clause.
2. Federal Usage
Of the Federal Courts of Appeal that have grappled with the
admissibility of residual hearsay against a criminal defendant,
many have utilized corroborating evidence as one indicator of reli-
ability. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits are
examples.
The fourth circuit allowed hearsay in the form of prior grand
jury testimony to be admitted as residual hearsay in at least two
instances. First, in United States v. West,70 the Court of Appeals
64. Id. at 545. Confessions are considered to "interlock" to the extent the
facts in each are similar. See Id. The interlocking is considered to be the corrobo-
rative evidence. See Wright 110 S.Ct: 3139.
65. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 528, 545 (1986).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
69. Id. at 192 (codefendant's out-of-court confession was admitted into
evidence).
70. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) The hearsay, admitted under FED. R. Evm.
804(b)(5), related to defendant's heroin dealings. Id.
354 [Vol. 14:347
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held that a significant factor of reliability enabling the hearsay to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause was that the hearsay statements
were corroborated by surveillance agents and audio recordings of
drug deals. Second, United States v. Garner7 1 upheld the admissi-
bility of out-of-court statements because it was strongly corrobo-
rated by the testimony of another witness and "undeniable
records."
The fifth circuit also admitted corroborative evidence in evalu-
ating reliability of hearsay. One of the corroborating factors sup-
porting the reliability of three co-offenders' statements made to
the F.B.I., was the similarity of the statements.72 Also the out-of-
court confession of an alleged accomplice to the defendant was ad-
missible against defendant under Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), in part be-
cause its reliability was "strongly corroborated by the testimony of
[narcotics] agents who took the confession. 73
Dealing with child declarants describing instances of sexual
abuse, recent cases in the Eighth Circuit also assessed reliability of
residual hearsay under Rule 803(24) by examining corroborative
evidence. In United States v. Renville,4 the fact that. a child made
essentially identical statements to medical personnel, foster par-
ents and others contributed significantly to the reliability of an
out-of-court statement by the child to a deputy sheriff. In a similar
case, medical evidence of physical abuse contributed to the relia-
bility of hearsay statements made to an F.B.I. Agent and a social
worker.73
Finally, in United States v. Nick,76 the Ninth Circuit evalu-
ated the reliability. of a three year old's out-of-court statement to
71. 574 F.2d 1141, 1146 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 434 U.S. 936 (1978).
72. United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir 1976), reh'g denied 545
F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1976)(approving the admissibility of incriminating statements
under FED. R. EVID. 803(24) as substantive evidence in prosecution for car thefts).
73. United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1978) (approving
the admissibility of the confession which implicated both the declarant and the
defendant).
74. 779 F.2d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 1985)(statement identifying the defendant as
the one who sexually abused her).
75. United States v. Cree 778 F.2d 474, 476 (8th Cir. 1985)(approved admissi-
bility); see also United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445 (8th Cir. 1986)(al-
lowing medical evidence to corroborate reliability of a child's statement concern-
ing sexual abuse).
76. 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979). The statement identified the defend-
ant as one who sexually abused the child: "[Nick] stuck his tutu in my butt." Id.
at 1201.
3551992]
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his mother in terms of all the circumstances in the case. Though
the statement was admitted as an "excited utterance," the Court
of Appeals indicated that the proper measure of trustworthiness
was a consideration of all probative evidence." The Court of Ap-
peals determined the statement to be reliable enough for the Con-
frontation Clause, because it was corroborated by physical evi-
dence and the fact that the defendant had the opportunity to
commit the abuse. 8
However, contrary to the above referenced circuits, the Sev-
enth Circuit has held that corroborative evidence is not a relevant
consideration in determining whether hearsay is reliable enough to
be admitted under a residual exception. 79
3. States' Usage
The use of corroborative evidence in determining reliability of
hearsay under nontraditional exceptions on the state level achieves
greater status than on the federal level. The heightened status is
more detectable in child sexual abuse exceptions to the hearsay
rule.8 0 As statutorily enacted, many of these exceptions require
that corroborative evidence be used to assess the reliability of
hearsay when the child declarant is unavailable to testify.8
In the context of residual exceptions, several state courts rea-
soned that reliability of hearsay must first be established to some
degree by the circumstances in which the statement was made.8 1
77. Id. at 1203.
78. Id. at 1204 (mother found semen in the child's underwear after picking
him up from Nick, the defendant, who was babysitting the child).
79. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
80. E.g., ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-4113
(1986); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 37, § 704-6(4)(C) (1989);
IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1988); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.120 (1987 supp.).
81. Id. The Washington statute permits the admissibility of out-of-court
statements made by a child under the age of ten "describing any act of sexual
contact performed with or on the child by another.. ." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.120 (1987 supp.) Generally, the statement is admissible after a showing of
circumstances that provide sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. However, as an ad-
ditional requirement, "when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement
may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act." .Id. The
Washington statute served as the model for similar exceptions enacted by some of
the other states. MYERS, supra, § 5.38.
82. E.g. State v. Allen, 755 P. 2d 1153, 1165 (Ariz. 1988); State v. Taylor, 704
[Vol. 14:347
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Then, "corroborative evidence may be used to 'bolster' the reliabil-
ity to the level sufficient to satisfy the residual exceptions."8 3 The
widespread use of corroborative evidence on the state level reveals
the perception that corroboration "makes a statement more relia-
ble because it increases the likelihood that the statement is true.
84
IV. ANALYSIS
The issue facing the Wright Court was "whether the admis-
sion at trial of hearsay statements by a child declarant to an exam-
ining pediatrician violates a defendant's rights under the Confron-
tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 8 5 Under the facts of this
case the Court determined the answer to be "yes."86 Yet, the
Court's opinion reveals that in fact patterns passing the reliability
test proferred by the Court the answer may be "no." The purpose
of this section is to analyze the holding and the Court's rationale,
with primary emphasis on the Majority's formulation of a test for
determining reliability of nontraditional hearsay under the Con-
frontation Clause.
A. The Holding
The Wright Court sought to clarify the Confrontation Clause
requirement, as enunciated in Roberts, that incriminating hearsay
admitted against a defendant bear "adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity."'87 Primarily, the Court focused on this reliability requirement
as it pertains to hearsay admitted under a non-firmly rooted ex-
ception; that is, the Court formulated a test for determining what
evidence constitutes a "showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" for nontraditional hearsay.8
The Court held that "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" for hearsay are based on a consideration of the "totality of
circumstances." 8 9 However, it limited the scope of consideration to
P.2d 443,453 (N.M. 1985).
83. Allen, 755 P.2d at 1165.
84. Id.; See State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d 289 (Kan. 1988); State v. J.C.E., 767
P.2d 309 (Mont. 1988); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987).
85. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3143 (1990).
86. Id. at 3153.
87. Id. at 3148.
88. Id. Another significant holding of the court was in reaffirming the Roberts
statement that firmly rooted hearsay is presumptively reliable without any offer
of proof. Id. at 3147.
89. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3148 (1990).
1992]
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those circumstances that "surround the making of the [hearsay]
statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of be-
lief."90 The Court rejected the state of Idaho's contention that the
totality of circumstances should also include other evidence at trial
that corroborates the truth of the out-of-court statement. 1 Thus,
the court held that in evaluating the reliability of residual hearsay,
consideration of corroborative evidence violates a defendant's con-
stitutional right to confront witnesses.92
The Court's rationale for excluding corroborating evidence
from the reliability test for residual hearsay consists of two main
elements:
(1) that corroborating evidence lacks the "inherent trust-
worthiness" needed to make cross examination of de-
clarant superfluous;
(2) that corroborating evidence provides a danger of "se-
lective reliability."
B. Inherent Trustworthiness
The Court declared that for hearsay evidence to be admissible
under the Confrontation Clause it "must possess indicia of reliabil-
ity by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to
other evidence at trial. ' 93 The Court derived this conclusion from
the idea that hearsay should only be admitted when it is so trust-
worthy that cross-examination of the declarant would add little to
the statement's reliability.94 According to the majority, indicia of
trustworthiness stem only from the circumstances surrounding the
making of the out-of-court statement.95 The Court based its deter-
mination on the rationale behind firmly rooted hearsay exceptions
and on selected legal precedent.96
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3150.
94. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990) (citing 5 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 1420, P. 251 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1974) for the proposition that cross-
examination is unnecessary if the hearsay statement offered "is free enough from
the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness........
95. Id.
96. Id.
[Vol. 14:347
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1. "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exceptions
The Court reasoned that surrounding circumstances are the
only appropriate measure for, gauging trustworthiness of nontradi-
tional hearsay by using firmly rooted hearsay exceptions as support
for the proposition. It reasoned that such exceptions are reliable
because statements falling within them are made under circum-
stances that sufficiently eliminate the possibility of fabrication.9 8
For example, the "excited utterance", "dying declarations" and
"statements for purposes of medical treatment" exceptions are
grounded in the belief that under circumstances such as pending
death, declarants lack a motive to lie or fabricate."
According to the Court, because the circumstances generally
indicate reliability, traditional hearsay has attained a presumption
of reliability. 10 Consequently, cross-examination is presumed to be
of marginal utility for traditional hearsay.
However, an unexplained gap in the Court's decision is why
the Court requires a greater degree of reliability for nontraditional
hearsay than it does for traditional hearsay.
2. Dual Standard of Reliability
The potential error' with the Court's use of "firmly rooted"
exceptions as the basis for excluding corroborative evidence is that
it creates a dual standard of reliability. 102 On the one hand, tradi-
tional hearsay - that falling within a firmly rooted exception - is
under the standard of "presumptive reliability;" it is admissible
without the presentation of extrinsic proof of reliability. 0 3 On the
other hand, nontraditional hearsay - that fitting within residual
and child hearsay exceptions - is under the standard of "particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness;" not only is it inadmissible
without extrinsic proof, the extrinsic proof cannot consist of cor-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
100. Id.
101. The reason the "error" is only potential is because the Court may decide
to reevaluate the presumption of reliability accorded some traditional hearsay.
Raiiing the standard for traditional to be equal with the standard established for
nontraditional will bring logical as well as Contitutional consistency to the mean-
ing of "reliability."
102. MYERs, supra s 5.38 at 376 (1991 supp.).
103. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
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roborative evidence to any extent.104 Thus, traditional hearsay is
more likely to be admitted, whether actually reliable or not,"0 5
while nontraditional hearsay is less likely to be admitted, regard-
less of how reliable.
In essence, the dual standard clouds the meaning of the term
"reliability," thereby forcing the courts into time consuming line
drawing.' Evidence of this point is the fact that "reliability" for
purposes of hearsay exceptions no longer has the same definition
for each hearsay exception. For example, as a prerequisite to ad-
missibility, the Federal Rules of Evidence require residual hearsay,
such as, rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)) to satisfy five criteria.10 7 One
criterion is that the hearsay have "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent" to the other specified exceptions. 108
Thus, once the residual hearsay satisfies the five criteria, it is sup-
posedly equivalent to, i.e. as reliable as, firmly rooted hearsay.10 9
Yet Wright not only requires a showing of further proof for non-
traditional hearsay, it also sharply limits the evidence that can
constitute such proof by excluding corrobative evidence,110 such as
medical evidence supporting the declarant's story.
As a result, "reliability is reliability is reliability" would not be
a proper expression of the Wright court's reliability standard, in so
far as criminal cases and hearsay are concerned. The Court stated
that the higher standard of reliability for hearsay to be admitted
under Confrontation Clause - as opposed to under the hearsay rule
- is justified."' This may be true, but arguably the standard should
104. Id.
105. See Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted:" Exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Goldman].
106. MYERS, supra s 5.38 at 376.
107. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 1985). The other
four criteria are:
(2) the statement must be offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) the statement must be more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts;
(4) the general purposes of the Federal Rules and the interests of justice
must be served by admission of the statement into evidence;
(5) The proponent of the evidence must give the adverse party the notice
specified within the rule.
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
111. Id. at 3146.
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be the same for all types of hearsay. It is inconsistent to sharply
increase the stringency of the trustworthiness standard for non-
traditional hearsay, while permitting traditional hearsay to main-
tain a lower standard, i.e., a presumption of reliability. 112 (That is,
if the Confrontation Clause requires a discernible degree of relia-
bility rather than a sliding scale.)
After all, the presumption of reliability for certain firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions is not beyond reproach. For example,
out-of-court statements of co-conspirators are presumptively relia-
ble without the need for any fact specific showing of surrounding
circumstances, simply because they fit within a traditional excep-
tion.113 However, in an age where plea bargaining and witness im-
munity are persuasive tools for gathering incriminating evidence
against a defendant, a co-conspirator may have a motive to fabri-
cate incriminating statements. Yet, under the Wright reliability
test, such statements continue to go untested.
Another result of the dual standard is that it blurs the prov-
ince of judicial discretion in the area of admissibility of evidence.
As discussed above, a judge's determination of when residual hear-
say possesses equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness to firmly
rooted hearsay, is no longer adequate when the hearsay is being
used in criminal cases.1 Consequently even when a judge con-
cludes that the four dangers of hearsay" 5 are remote enough to
make residual or child hearsay sufficiently reliable for admission,
his judgment may lack Sixth Amendment adequacy under Wright.
3. Legal Precedent
As support for its holding that inherent trustworthiness of
statements is not shown by corroborating evidence, the Wright
majority utilized selected legal authority. First, the court adopted
the Seventh Circuit's viewpoint: the specific exceptions to the
hearsay rule are based on the guarantees of trustworthiness that
existed at the time the statement was made and "'not those that
may be added by using hindsight.' "1 The Court adopted the
112. See MYERS, supra note 102.
113. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
114. Supra note 109.
115. LOUISELL AND MUELLER, supra § 472 (describes the four hearsay dangers
as being the possibility of the declarant's misperception, faulty narration, inaccu-
rate memory and insincerity).
116. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (quoting Huff v. White Motor
1992]
15
Wadsworth: Constitutional Admissibility of Hearsay under the Confrontation C
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
viewpoint as one that applies to "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" in the Confrontation Clause context as well." 7
Second, the Court attempted to bolster its holding by citing to
Lee v. Illinois for the proposition that corroborative evidence does
not contribute to reliability. 118 In Lee, the Court concluded that
the reliability of a co-defendant's confession was inadequate even
though it "interlocked" with the defendant's confession." 9 Also,
the Court cited a case from the State of Washington 20 which simi-
larly held that indicia of reliability for the hearsay at issue could
only be formed from surrounding circumstances and not subse-
quent corroboration of the criminal act.' 2 '
Though the Court cited the above cases as being agreeable
with its holding, it is possible that the majority stretched, the
precedents and ignored prevalent legal precedents in support of
using corroborating evidence' 2 2 As to stretching of precedent, the
Court took Lee v. Illinois and State v. Ryan out of context. 123 The
Court in Lee ultimately determined that the co-defendant's confes-
sion did not interlock enough to contribute to particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness.2 2 However, it also recognized that there
could be instances where fewer discrepancies would permit the in-
terlocking nature of confessions to be used in conjunction with sur-
rounding circumstances as indicia of reliability. 25 Even to the ex-
tent that Lee might be interpreted as discounting the propriety of
the "interlocking" nature of confessions, that Court made no asser-
tion that other forms of corroborative evidence lack relevance in
the evaluation of trustworthiness.12 6
As the dissent pointed out, the Wright majority also took
State v. Ryan out of context. 27 First, Ryan interpreted the Wash-
Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 528, 544 (1986).
120. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1987).
121. Idaho v. Wright, Ill. S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990)Y
122. Id. at 3153 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy is joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun. Id. However, it is well
recognized that the United States Supreme Court is not constitutionally bound to
follow either state or federal precedents.
123. Id.
124. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 528, 544 (1986).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3154 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ington statute establishing a child hearsay exception for state-
ments related to physical abuse, and not the Confrontation
Clause.12 8 Secondly, the majority neglected to address the fact that
the same Washington statute actually requires corroborative evi-
dence when the child declarant is unavailable to testify.129 Accord-
ing to the Washington Court of Appeals, the statute's corrobora-
tion "requirement provides additional protection against
fabricated or imagined allegations in situations when the defend-
ant will be unable to cross-examine the declarant. ' 'la ° Thus, as an
aggregate, the law of Washington recognized that corroborative ev-
idence is probative in bolstering the reliability of non-firmly rooted
hearsay.
The Court also chose not to acknowledge pervasive legal
precedents supporting the use of corroborating evidence in evalu-
ating the reliability of nontraditional hearsay. As discussed above,
the United States Supreme Court, Federal Courts of Appeal, and
State Courts utilized corroborative evidence as one of several fac-
tors in determining the reliability of nontraditional hearsay. For
example, the United States Supreme Court used it in Dutton v.
Evans, a plurality opinion."' Though the majority admitted to the
Dutton Court usage of corroborating evidence as a factor in assess-
ing reliability of hearsay, it decided not to follow suit. The Court
dismisses the Dutton analysis by stating that the use of cor-
roborating evidence at trial "more appropriately indicates that any
error in admitting the [hearsay] might be harmless rather than [a
basis] for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy."'3 2
However, the dissent established that the majority's interpre-
tation is misplaced, by providing a 1987 precedent to the contrary.
Justice Kennedy quoted from Cruz v. New York for its proposition
that the admission of corroborative evidence pertains to reliability
of hearsay, and not a determination of harmless error in the admis-
sion of hearsay.' 33
128. See State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (1987).
129. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
130. State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d 566, 571 (Wash. 1987).
131. 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1986) (interlocking nature of confessions by co-
defendants).
132. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
133. Id., at 3155 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The full quote is:
"Quite obviously, what the 'interlocking' nature of the codefendant's con-
fession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: If it
confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant's own confession it is
1992] 363
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Far from dissuading their courts in the use of corroboration,
many states statutorily recognized a legitimate role for corrobora-
tive evidence in assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay.14 States
with child sexual abuse exceptions often go so far as to require the
use of corroborating evidence when the declarant is unavailable to
testify. 3 5 As shown by the discussion of state usage above, therole
of corroborative evidence in states requiring it is supplemental. 30
Only after a certain degree of reliability is established by sur-
rounding circumstances can corroborative evidence be used as fur-
ther indicia of reliability. 37 This practice strikes a balance that
does not rely on corroborative evidence, but rather gives it a justi-
fiable supporting role. Arizona and Washington courts justify the
role with the common sense perception that corroborative evidence
confirms or bolsters reliability by increasing the likelihood that the
hearsay is true.3 8
Pointing out the existence of legal authority to the contrary of
the Court is not intended to say that the Court is constitutionally
bound to "follow the crowd." It is not. However, in the context of
hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, the Wright Court itself
stated that firmly rooted hearsay presumptively satisfies the con-
stitutional requirement of reliability because of the great weight
accorded " longstanding judicial and legislative experience in as-
sessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court state-
ments." 13 9 By contrast, the Court did not accord the same weight
to longstanding judicial and legislative experience in the area of
non-firmly rooted exceptions. The majority's doublespeak led the
dissent to conclude that the Court's misgiving about the weight to
be given corroborative evidence unjustifiably led it to "wholesale
elimination of such evidence from consideration, in derogation of
more likely to be true."
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192 (1987).
134. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3154 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
135. Supra note 78.
136. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.120 (1988).
137. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.120 (1988).
138. State v. Allen, 755 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Ariz. 1988); State v. Hunt, 741 P.2d
566, 571 (Wash. 1987).
139. Wright, 110 U.S. at 3147.
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overwhelming judicial and legislative consensus to the contrary. 140
4. Factors of Reliability
In excluding corroborative evidence from an evaluation of
trustworthiness, the Court limited the evaluation to circumstances
surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement.1' There-
fore, in order to clarify what circumstances were constitutionally
appropriate for consideration, the Court listed several factors of
reliability for hearsay statements made by sexually abused chil-
dren: spontaneity and consistent repetition; the mental state of the
child at time of the statement; the use of terminology unexpected
of a child of similar age; and the lack of motive to fabricate.1 42
These factors were given by way of illustration and are not exhaus-
tive.143 According to the court, "the unifying principle is that these
factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely
to be telling the truth when the statement was made."1 4
However, the Court did not discuss why trustworthiness is ex-
hibited only by factors surrounding the making of the statement.
In other words, the Court did not explain why the incident of mak-
ing the statement must be viewed in isolation from all other events
constituting the whole of the environment in which the child was
situated. The dissent responded, "[i]t is a matter of common sense
for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether
what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by
other evidence." 346
Aside from the common sense rationale offered by the dissent,
another reason for permitting the use of corroborating factors in
determining reliability of nontraditional hearsay is the severe lack
of evidence in offenses such as child sexual abuse." 6 This proposi-
tion is supported by the fact that child abuse, especially sexual
abuse, is a crime committed in secret.147 The lack of witnesses, the
submissive, vulnerable, and perhaps guilty feelings of a child
140. Id. at 3154 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 3148.
142. Id.
143. Id. Other appropriate factors may include: whether the statement was
elicited by questioning, and age and maturity of declarant. MYERS, supra § 5.38 at
207 (1991 supp.).
144. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
145. Id. at 3153 (dissenting).
146. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988).
147. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
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abused by a loved one, and the "hidden scars" of abuse may all
contribute to the difficulty in detecting and prosecuting. the
crime. 148 Thus, the inability to utilize a child's out-of-court state-
ments can jeopardize prosecution for the victims who have little
physical evidence to prove that they were abused.""
For example, the Court excludes corroborating factors which
nevertheless may -enhance the reliability of child hearsay. 15° Ac-
cording to Myers, an expert on child witnesses, such corroborating
factors include: medical evidence of physical abuse; abnormal al-
terations in the child's behavior (e.g., bedwetting); more than one
person overheard the child's statement; the child reduced the
statement into writing or a drawing; there is more than one victim
with the same story and the victims did not collaborate; an eyewit-
ness testifies to the abuse described in the child's statement; de-
fendant had the opportunity to commit the act; a confession or
admission by the defendant; and the defendant has a history of the
misconduct described by the child.15' However, with the Court's
holding, the presence of any of these factors in a child abuse case is
irrelevant as they may relate to the reliability of a child's out-of-
court statement.
C. Selective Reliability
Finally, another reason for the Court's malaise with corrobora-
tive evidence, as stated by the Wright majority, was that such evi-
dence presents a danger of "selective reliability."' This concern
focuses on the idea that a jury will infer that an entire hearsay
statement is trustworthy, even though only a portion of the state-
ment is corroborated by evidence.'53
At first glance this rationale appears to exhibit a lack of trust
in the jury on the issue of weighing evidence. The jury has been a
cornerstone in the English and American legal systems;' 5' its roots
148. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 943.
149. Id.
150. MYERS, supra § 5.37B, at 215 (1991 supp.).
151. Id.,
152. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3151 (1990).
153. Id. For example, a child's statement may contain allegations of sexual
abuse and may identify the abuser. However, medical evidence that corroborates
the abuse allegation, has no bearing on the reliability of the portion identifying
the abuser. Id.
154. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 244, p. 579 (Edward W. Cleary et. al., eds.,
2nd Ed. 1972).
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in common law are traceable to the 9th century A.D. 55 The prov-
ince of the jury as the trier of fact is to give weight to evidence
based on its own collective experience and judgment. Theoretically
at least, the fact that the task of weighing evidence is difficult at
times should not diminish the province of the jury.
However, the Court's rationale on this point should not be
given short shrift. The Court may be recognizing the fallibility of
the legal fiction that limiting instructions prevent the jury from
giving inordinate weight to certain evidence.
Perhaps another way of solving potential problems of selective
reliability is to exclude those portions of a hearsay statement that
are not corroborated by evidence or are not otherwise trustworthy.
Such a solution would permit reliable and probative evidence to be
admitted without a manifest injustice caused by wholesale exclu-
sion. 156 Also cross-examination may be used by the defendant to
bring to light what it is that corroborative evidence actually
corroborates.1 5
7
CONCLUSION
Logically, it would seem that factors should not be viewed in
isolation of one another. To use an analogy, the picture of a jigsaw
puzzle is more readily identifiable when all the pieces to the puzzle
are used and connected. By the same token, the reliability of a
hearsay statement may be determined by examining the interrela-
tionship of all circumstances, rather than dissecting a select few in
isolation, while ignoring the existence of the rest.
The Wright Court did not adhere to this viewpoint. The Court
held that corroborative evidence cannot be used to evaluate the
reliability of nontraditional hearsay. As a result, the Court in-
creased the stringency of the reliability standard for some hearsay
exceptions, while continuing to presume the reliability of others.
Consequently, a dual standard of reliability is left in tact from the
1980 Roberts decision. Should the Court reevaluate the presump-
tion of reliability maintained by firmly rooted hearsay exceptions,
such as "statements by a co-conspirator," then the Confrontation
Clause standard of reliability proferred by the Court might be con-
155. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 109 (5th ed.
1956).
156. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
157. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3155 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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sistent. If it does, the trend toward enhancing the criminal defend-
ant's right to confront witnesses begun by Wright will continue,
perhaps with continued detriment to sexually abused child
declarants.
A. Perry Wadsworth, Jr.
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